Pelican Institute’s Guide to the Fall 2026 Constitutional Amendments

What it does: Allows a disabled veteran’s surviving spouse to transfer an existing additional property tax exemption to a new home, one time, capped at the value of the original exemption.

Is it good for Louisiana? The state constitution contains more than a dozen categories of property tax exemptions, spanning homesteads, veterans, first responders, and various commercial and industrial uses. The Pelican Institute has long championed tax policies that are low, flat, fair, and broadly applied. This approach reduces confusion and complexity in the tax code, and does not enable the government to shift the tax burden from one group to another. Tax exemptions allow the government to pick winners and losers, with the non-exempt group having to pay more to make up the difference in revenue. Without a principled approach to the tax code, there is no shortage of special-interest groups that could make a compelling case for an exemption.

What it does: Allows local taxing authorities to raise millage rates back up to their previously voter-approved maximum after voluntarily lowering them, without going back to voters for approval each time.

Is it good for Louisiana? Governing authorities should make every effort to minimize tax burdens on the people they serve. A taxing authority’s maximum millage roll forward is currently tied to a four-year property value reappraisal cycle, whether or not raising it is budgetarily necessary. If local taxing authorities lower millage rates below the voter-approved maximum, they lose the ability to tax at this level when the roll forward occurs. The idea behind this amendment is that taxing authorities will no longer be incentivized to raise millage rates to their maximum for the sake of not losing the ability to do so later on, enabling property tax relief.

What it does: Prohibits release on bail for defendants convicted of certain aggravated offenses against a minor child, covering the period between conviction and sentencing or during appeal.

Is it good for Louisiana? Markets function on the strength of secure institutions and enforceable law; protecting that foundation is a legitimate, limited role of government. There’s a public-safety and victim-protection rationale specific to this offense class: child victims and their families are at risk of intimidation or contact with the convicted offender during a lengthy appeals process. However, this amendment also eliminates judicial discretion, and there will be cases where a conviction is later overturned. A judge would be unable to weigh evidence that emerges post-trial. Given the permanency of constitutional amendments, blanket categorical rules such as this might be more appropriate in statute, allowing flexibility to adjust later if necessary.

What it does: Imposes a lifetime cap on the number of terms a governor can serve, barring anyone who has served more than one and a half terms from holding the office again.

Is it good for Louisiana? Concentrated, long-tenured executive power can entrench incumbents, their allies, and the regulatory and spending priorities they’ve built up over time. A governor who can return after a term out gives that network of allies and appointees continued incentive to stay aligned with him or her. On the other hand, this new limit could mean the loss of good, experienced leadership as an option in elections. As a structural restriction, it would also limit future voter sovereignty by substituting the judgment of today’s Legislature and electorate for the judgment of voters in future elections.

What other states do: Nationally, 37 states impose some form of gubernatorial term limit. Twenty-eight states — including Louisiana under its current constitution — allow a governor to return to office after sitting out at least one term. Nine states — Arkansas, California, Delaware, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oklahoma — impose a lifetime limit, permanently barring a governor who has reached the maximum from holding the office again. Virginia is unique: its governor cannot serve consecutive terms, but faces no lifetime cap and may return after sitting out a term. Meanwhile, 13 states impose no gubernatorial term limits at all. Some of the country’s largest states — including Texas, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts — are among them.

Some historical context: Louisiana’s own history helps illustrate what a lifetime cap would actually change in practice. Edwin Edwards served four terms as governor across three separate stints (1972–1980, 1984–1988, and 1992–1996), repeatedly leaving office only to return years later. Under Amendment 4’s proposed lifetime cap, Edwards would never have been eligible to seek his third or fourth terms. Earl “Uncle Earl” Long presents a similar, lesser-known case: after completing a partial term in 1939–1940 (finishing Governor Richard Leche’s term following his resignation) and then a full elected term from 1948 to 1952, Long had already exceeded a term and a half of cumulative service before he ever returned for his final full term from 1956 to 1960 — meaning a lifetime limit like the one Amendment 4 proposes would likely have foreclosed that final term as well.

What it does: Currently, when the state has one-time surplus funds to put toward public pension debt, they must go to the oldest unfunded liability first. This amendment would let retirement systems apply those funds to any unfunded liability, not just the oldest one.

Is it good for Louisiana? Reducing and eliminating debt is a necessary component of fiscal stability and responsibility. The government is responsible for utilizing taxpayer funds responsibly and minimizing tax burdens. Louisiana’s current rule, which is to always pay the oldest unfunded liability first, is a bit like being legally required to use the “debt snowball” method popularized by Dave Ramsey, where you tackle your smallest or oldest debt first for the psychological win, regardless of what it actually costs you. But when the goal is maximizing taxpayer savings rather than emotional momentum, financial advisors more often point to the “debt avalanche” method instead: target whichever debt is generating the most cost first, since that’s what saves the most money over time. The oldest unfunded liability isn’t necessarily the one accruing the highest costs or offering the greatest recurring savings if paid down early. Sometimes a newer liability fits that description better. This amendment simply gives retirement systems the flexibility to apply one-time surplus dollars wherever they’ll do the most good, rather than locking the state into an arbitrary “oldest first” rule.

What it does: Louisiana already freezes assessed home values for qualifying seniors under the state’s income-based assessment freeze. This amendment stacks an additional property tax exemption on top of that freeze, for homeowners who are 65 or older.

Is it good for Louisiana? Broad-based tax relief that lowers the overall burden is preferable to narrow carve-outs, because narrow exemptions shift the remaining tax burden onto everyone else without shrinking government spending itself. This amendment is a targeted benefit for a specific group rather than a broad-based cut, and adds complexity to the tax code.

What it does: This adds a very narrow and specific exception to the Louisiana Constitution’s anti-donation clause. Federal law already requires water systems nationwide to replace lead service lines, and Louisiana is drawing down federal infrastructure dollars to help cover that cost. What’s in question here is whether the state constitution allows public money, including lines identified as containing hazardous materials under EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule, to reach the segment of a service line owned by the property owner, not just the segment owned by the utility.

Is it good for Louisiana? Maintaining safe drinking water infrastructure is a reasonable function of government. But there is strong reason for concern regarding the slippery slope of making this exception to Louisiana’s strict anti-donation clause. Once the door has been opened to using public funds for infrastructure on private property, other interest groups can point to this example to justify requests for their own carve-outs. This amendment could also create a cost-bearing inequity because homeowners who already paid out of pocket to replace their own service line get nothing, while others may get a taxpayer-funded fix.

What it does: Prohibits foreign adversary nations or their agents — as defined under federal law, including China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela — from using Louisiana’s expropriation process to force the sale or seizure of private property.

Is it good for Louisiana? Secure and enforceable property rights are foundational to a functioning market economy, and shielding property owners from coercive action tied to hostile foreign governments is consistent with that principle. This amendment restricts a government power, fitting within a limited-government framework.

What it does: Raises the qualifying income threshold for Louisiana’s special property tax assessment level — which freezes a home’s taxable value for eligible seniors and disabled residents — from $100,000 to $150,000.

Is it good for Louisiana? Freezing taxable value regardless of a home’s actual appreciation distorts the link between market value and tax liability, and shifts the tax burden onto homeowners who don’t qualify. Raising the income cap expands how many households get that special treatment, resulting in a larger distortion and narrower tax base for everyone else.

What it does: Authorizes local governments to offer property tax exemptions to owners who rehabilitate blighted or derelict properties, under defining laws the Legislature would set.

Is it good for Louisiana? As with Amendments 1, 6, and 9, targeted exemptions narrow the tax base and shift the remaining burden elsewhere at an increased cost.